Abstract: Although the Women, Infants and Children (WIC) Program is a key part of America's safety net, its structure fails to incentivize participants to be cost conscious in their purchases and may cause retailers to attach excessive markups to WIC products. Unlike the more familiar SNAP program, WIC allocates food instruments (FI) to participants, which enable the participant to buy specific nutritious foods indicated on the FI. Participants' demands for these foods are in essence perfectly inelastic. We investigate cost containment in the WIC Program, with focus on California. Results show that smaller vendors often set excessive markups for WIC foods. The large amount of choice afforded to participants in California regarding products, brands, and package sizes also detracts from the goal of cost containment. However, larger vendors do not markup WIC foods more or promote them less than comparable control products. Cost containment can be improved by limiting participant choice, targeting Program sales to larger vendors, and using large-vendor prices as benchmarks to limit prices set by smaller vendors.
WIC-eligible products, thereby diminishing the impact achievable through the annual fixed budget appropriation received by each local WIC agency. Although cost containment is a key focus of FNS guidelines and regulations governing the WIC program, the effectiveness of costcontainment strategies specified therein and employed by local agencies is not clear and has been a topic of discussion and debate throughout the program's history and remains an ongoing concern (Montgomery and Splett 1997 , Davis and Leibtag 2005 , Ludwig and Miller 2005 , Davis 2007 , Oliveira and Frazao 2009 . Given that FNS oversight and regulations are uniform across local agencies (FNS 2013) , results from this study apply broadly to WIC programs in most other states.
Despite the incentive problems for participants and retailers created by the structure of the WIC program, most prior research on WIC and cost containment has focused somewhat narrowly on manufacturer pricing for infant formula and the implications of sole-source contracting for formula by state agencies (e.g., U.S. Government Accountability Office 1990, Oliveira et al. 2004 , Oliveira and Davis 2006 , Betson 2009 , and Davis 2011 . The paucity of research attention given to WIC Program retailers is surprising given the common perception that market power in the food system has become concentrated in the retail sector (Mills 1999 , Chen 2003 , Villas-Boas 2007 , and Ellickson 2007 and that FNS cost-containment regulations focus specifically upon the behavior of retail vendors.
We seek to fill the void in the literature regarding retailers' pricing and promotions for WIC-eligible products and to provide recommendations for improved cost containment in the program. Our study utilizes the entirety of FI redemptions made under the CA WIC Program for the 29-month period from October 2009 -February 2012, about 150 million observations in total.
We also examine two additional data sets involving weekly wholesale costs and retail prices for several large California supermarket chains to gauge specifically the behavior of supermarket chains with respect to pricing and promoting of WIC-eligible products relative to selected control products.
The econometric results are then utilized to conduct simulations that consider approaches to improve cost containment in the WIC Program. Key results show that the cost-containment system in California was largely ineffective at restraining the pricing of smaller WIC vendors.
Larger retailers, such as traditional grocery supermarkets, were found to charge much lower prices for WIC products than their smaller counterparts, and, moreover, we found no evidence that large retailers mark up WIC products at a differential rate or promote them differently compared to a control group of comparable products that are not WIC eligible. These results support a cost-containment strategy that (i) encourages participants to redeem FI at large retailers whenever possible, and (ii) relies upon the prices charged for WIC FI by larger retailers to set benchmarks for allowable pricing by smaller vendors, who, based upon study results, are most likely to manipulate prices based upon the Program incentives.
Basic Operational Features of the California WIC Program
FNS regulations specify criteria for delivery systems for the supplemental foods provided by the WIC Program. Oliveira and Frazao (2009) provide a thorough discussion of the FNS regulations.
Although home delivery and direct distribution systems are authorized by FNS, 3 the dominant distribution system nationally is retail delivery through authorized retail vendors such as is used in California. FNS requires that retail delivery systems use FI and cash-value vouchers (CVV) that indicate, on the instrument, the supplemental foods authorized by the FI or voucher, the first and last date the FI or voucher may be used, and provide space for the purchase price to be entered. CVV are used for the purchase of fruits and vegetables and have a fixed dollar value.
Participants, thus, do have incentives to shop for value with CVV to maximize the amount and quality of product that can be purchased with the voucher. CVV thus have the same essential economic features as the vouchers provided through the SNAP program, and CVV are not a focus of the present study.
Although California issues many FI, a relative few FI and CVV account for most of the redemptions and program expenditures in California-e.g., the largest seven (15) FI/CVV collectively account for over 50% (75%) of Program food expenditures. Many of the FIs, including the leaders based upon redemptions, authorize the purchase of a combination of foods.
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For example, the leading FI in terms of number of redemptions in CA is FI 6012, which authorizes a participant to purchase one gallon and one quart of low-fat cow's milk, one lb. of 
Vendors and Peer Groups
Vendors are authorized on a store-by-store basis. FNS regulations specify procedures that state agencies must implement to promote competitive pricing among authorized vendors. Specifically, the regulations require that states establish a vendor peer group system and set "distinct competitive price criteria and allowable reimbursement levels for each peer group" (7 CFR §246.12(4)). The regulations specify that at least two criteria must be used for establishing vendor peer groups, and one criterion must be geography. California uses the number of cash registers operated by a vendor (in essence, a proxy for store size and sales volume) as its second criterion for peer grouping. California has utilized five vendor groupings based upon number of 5 http://www.cdph.ca.gov/PROGRAMS/WICWORKS/Pages/WIC-AuthorizedFoodListWAFL.aspx 6 As a matter of policy, California grants participants wide latitude in choosing brands and products. One dimension of cost containment is to limit participant choice to exclude more expensive brands within eligible product categories, which is an allowable strategy under WIC regulations.
registers-1-2, 3-4, 5-6, 7-9, and 10 and above-and three groupings based upon geography intended to represent high-, medium-, and low-priced counties. register stores above the average redemption value charged for that FI by stores with five or more registers in their geographic region. Notably the redemption data analyzed for this study were from a time period (Oct. 2009 -Feb. 2012 ) when MADR rates for 1-2 and 3-4 register vendors were computed according to equation (1), and the effectiveness, or lack thereof, of these MADR rates as a cost-containment tool is a key question addressed in the study.
Participant and Vendor Incentives in the WIC Program
Participants are issued FI and CVV based upon their eligibility and needs. Because foods obtained through the program are provided at no direct cost to participants, they lack incentive to shop at vendors offering the lowest prices for the FI and, moreover, when FI allow the purchase of different products, package sizes, and brands, as is often the case, participants have no incentive to seek the best value among the available options.
Given that direct cost is not a consideration, the main factors motivating participants' 
Vendor Incentives
As of January 2012, CA had 5,581 authorized WIC Program vendors including A-50 vendors.
Most grocers find it profitable to participate in the WIC Program. WIC participants comprise a large share of sales for some products such as formula and infant foods. Thus, non-authorized retailers would foreclose a significant share of the market for these products, and, further, they would risk losing the business of WIC participants entirely if the participants were unable to redeem their FI and CVV at the store.
The matter of how participation in the WIC Program influences a vendor's incentives regarding pricing is complicated because non A-50 vendors typically sell thousands of different product codes, with large supermarkets commonly selling more than 40,000 product codes (Dimitri, Tegene, and Kaufman 2003) . Thus, food retailers do not price individual products solely based upon that product's characteristics, but, rather, they set prices for the entire constellation of products sold in the store with an eye towards overall profitability of the store.
This practice is known as "category management" and has become ubiquitous in food retailing (e.g., Zenor, 1994, and Dhar et al. 2001) .
A simple way to conceptualize retailer pricing decisions is to consider that most grocery shoppers purchase a "basket" of foods in any shopping trip, so the variable profit of a retailer in any time period can be expressed as the product of the profit margin on the "average" market basket of foods purchased in the store times the number of shoppers the store attracts. Raising store prices increases the profit margin on purchases that are made, but detracts from the number of shoppers who visit the store. Thus, retailers must balance the positive impact of higher prices on profit margin against their negative impact on store traffic.
This latter impact depends upon the competition the store faces from rivals. Grocery stores are generally distributed spatially, and, given consumers' nontrivial travel costs, it is reasonable that each store has some degree of market power over those consumers located in close proximity to it , Cotterill 1986 , Walden 1990 , Azzam 1999 , and Kaufman 2000 . In the words of Ellickson (2007) grocery retailing is a "natural oligopoly," and the number of customers patronizing a store is somewhat inelastic to the store's prices.
The combination of WIC participants who lack incentives to be cost conscious and imperfect competition among retailers is the genesis of concern that pricing in the WIC program may not be cost competitive. Introducing through the WIC program a share of the store's customers who are insensitive (inelastic) to price for the products contained in their WIC FIs, may induce vendors to set prices and margins for WIC products higher than for comparable products that are not part of the WIC Program and to put WIC products on sale less frequently.
WIC participants' inelastic demands for the products in their WIC FIs make the overall demand for the product facing the vendor less elastic than if the product were not part of the WIC
Program. This effect is magnified the greater the fraction of a store's sales of the product that are made to WIC customers.
However, the fundamental result that a profit-maximizing seller with market power will charge a greater markup over cost for a product (i.e., higher Lerner index), the less elastic is the demand facing the seller for that product applies to a single-product seller, and even smaller WIC vendors may sell thousands of different product codes. Most of the products dispensed through the WIC program are staples (e.g., milk, eggs, cheese, breads) that likely play an important role in driving traffic to a store. Thus, vendors may not impose an additional markup due to a product's WIC status due to concern for store traffic, even though the calculus for profit maximization for the specific products would indicate that they should.
Importantly, the fundamental tradeoff between higher margins and store traffic that food retailers face is likely to be resolved differently among retailers as a function of the store size and share of WIC participants among the customer base. Market baskets purchased at large supermarkets will normally contain more products than at small convenience stores, and WIC participants likely comprise a larger share of customers for many smaller vendors, relative to most large supermarkets. Thus, the loss in profit to the supermarket from reduced traffic if the store raises prices for staple commodities contained in WIC FIs, will exceed the loss to a small convenience store for which the typical customer buys only a few products in addition to redeeming WIC FI, and a relatively large share of customers are WIC participants. The limiting case is the A-50 vendors who sell few, if any, non-WIC products and attract comparably few or no non-WIC customers. Thus, theory predicts that cost-containment concerns are most pronounced for smaller WIC vendors, as measured in California for peer-grouping purposes and for this study by the number of cash registers they operate.
As to impacts of a product's WIC eligibility on the likelihood of retailers offering the product on sale, economic theory offers two main motivations for sales: i) to attract the patronage of elastic-demand customers, and ii) to attract customers to the store in expectation that they will purchase regular-price items in addition to the sale item (Blattberg, Briesch, and Fox 1995) . Either motivation is attenuated for WIC-eligible products because WIC customers' demands are perfectly inelastic and WIC customers will not be induced to visit a store due to sales of WIC items, which they can obtain for free. Thus, depending upon the share of a store's potential customer base represented by WIC participants, the potential also exists that a product's WIC-eligible status will cause it to be offered on sale less frequently and further detract from cost containment.
Analysis of California WIC FI Redemptions
To examine vendor pricing in the CA WIC program, we focus on the three most frequently redeemed FI, 6012, 6003, and 6011 ( 
Figure 1. Box Plot for FI 6012 by Register Peer Group
Our econometric model specified the redemption value for a FI as a function of the number of registers operated by the vendor, the vendor's county location, and month within the 29-month window. 11 In essence, it is a fixed-effects regression model, with each vendor identified by its county location and number of cash registers, the two factors involved in peergroup setting in CA. Standard errors were clustered on peer group.
Results of the econometric analysis (excluding the county and month fixed effects) are contained in Tables 2-4. Table 1 reports results for the combination FIs 6003, 6011, and 6012.
The omitted default register group is one register. The MADR rate itself was considered as an explanatory variable but was ultimately excluded based upon its lack of statistical significance. Fewer than 2% of redemptions during the 29-month period for any of the FI included in the study were made at or within 1.0% of the MADR rate, indicating that in nearly all instances the MADR formula in equation (1) that there is considerable variability in pricing in any time period among stores with the same number of registers and county locations. Stated alternatively, the cost containment strategy reflected in equation (1) was not restraining pricing for vendors who found it optimal to charge very high prices for WIC products.
These results suggest the potential efficacy of a cost-containment strategy designed to emphasize, to the extent possible, Program sales through larger (6+ register) vendors and also to use larger vendors' redemption values as a benchmark to gauge the performance of smaller
vendors. Yet unanswered, however, is the question of whether larger vendors are nonetheless attaching additional mark ups to WIC eligible products and offering them on sale less frequently, as economic theory suggests they might. We turn our attention to this question in the next section.
Grocery Retailer Markups and Promotions of WIC-Eligible Products
The data set utilized to investigate large grocery retailer markups of WIC-eligible and select control products include weekly wholesale cost, retail prices, product description, package quantity, product size, and UPC code for three supermarket chains in Northern CA and four Wholesale costs and retail prices are averaged for each supermarket chain and location in each week.
WIC-eligible products in a given food category were compared to a group of control products in the same food category. To facilitate the identification of WIC-eligible and control products, we focused on the following categories where authorization criteria are very specific (e.g., specific brands and package sizes are indicated): ready-to-eat breakfast cereal, formula, and infant fruit, vegetables, cereal, and meat. A product was included as a control if it was not WICeligible based upon only one of three product dimensions: size, type, or form that define WIC eligibility.
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We computed the Lerner index for each WIC and control product as the difference between retail price and wholesale price, divided by the retail price. Table 5 contains proportional markups for the eight chains in the dataset and in total for several ready-to-eat breakfast cereals and their control products. 13, 14 The results strongly indicate that the WICeligible cereals are not marked up more than their control-product counterparts. Indeed, in each instance, the markups are almost identical.
We examined three types of infant formula: milk-based powder, milk-based concentrate, and soy-based powder. Overall the results for formula displayed in table 6 show that across all three categories retailers do not systematically markup WIC-eligible formula, relative to control products. Both the milk-based powder and milk-based concentrate subcategories have very similar markups for WIC-eligible and control products, both at the individual chain level and in total. The markups for soy-based powder differ more across individual chains and in total, relative to the milk-based formula subcategories, but more often than not control products have a higher markup than WIC-eligible products.
12 For example, in CA only 16-ounce blocks or rounds of cheddar, colby, jack, mozzarella, or some combination thereof are WIC eligible cheeses. Thus, a 32-ounce block of cheddar was coded as a control product, as it was eliminated from WIC-eligibility based only upon its size. Also, a 16-ounce block of Swiss cheese was included as a control, as it would be WIC-eligible if it were a different type (flavor/variety). Conversely a 32-ounce block of Swiss cheese would be excluded as a control because it differs from WIC-eligible products on two dimensions. 13 The Safeway data for Northern CA was broken into two geographic areas: San Francisco Bay Area and Sacramento Area. We refer to these different geographic designations as separate chains. 14 A missing value in tables 5 -7 means that prices were not reported by the chain in that category or were excluded because of anomalies in the data .
Table 5. Grocery Retailer Ready-to-Eat Breakfast Cereal Markups for WIC-Eligible and Control Products
In general the markups for both WIC and control formula are very low-5.4% on average for the WIC-contracted milk-based powder formula and 5.2% for the control formulas in the same subcategory. The failure of the supermarkets to set a higher markup for WIC formula is especially striking, given it is the only WIC product that has a sole-source contract, and the share of the product category dispensed through WIC is so large-nearly 50% statewide. 
Grocery Retailer Infant Formula Markups for WIC-Eligible and Control Products
WIC-eligible infant cereals and meats were marked up somewhat on average relative to the control products in the category, but four of the eight chains have higher markups for control products than the WIC-eligible infant cereals. For infant vegetables and fruits, control products on average were marked up higher than WIC-eligible products, a result that held consistently across individual chains. In general, markups are low for these infant foods, suggesting that chains use favorable prices on infant foods as a way to attract customers to their stores.
The product categories, i, contained in tables 5 -7 were combined into a fixed-effects regression model, wherein a product's Lerner index (L) was regressed on its WIC eligibility status and fixed effects to account for retail chain j, and product category k, i.e.,
In another version of the model, the WIC dummy variable was also interacted with the chain fixed effects to look for chain-specific strategies in pricing WIC products. In the model without the WIC-chain interaction, = −0.020, t = 2.87, i.e., WIC products were on average marked up 
Promotional Frequency and Depth of WIC-Eligible Products
The data set for this analysis includes weekly prices and promotions for over 2,699 WIC-Eligible and control products in 11 WIC-eligible food categories (infant fruits and vegetables, canned fruits, canned vegetables, cheese, dried beans, eggs, canned fish, infant formula, milk, cereal, and The data were obtained by downloading them from the supermarkets' websites. Every observation includes product shelf price, which is the undiscounted price or the price affixed to 15 See Volpe and Li (2012) for further discussion of the data and the collection process. Conversations with representatives from both chains confirm that the prices gathered electronically for online retailing are identical to the prices available in store. Thus, results reported here apply to both online and in-store sales. the shelf on which the product is sold, ii) promotional price, 16 and iii) an indicator variable equal to one if the product is on promotion and zero otherwise. Promotional frequency is the percentage of time that a given product is on price promotion. Promotional depth is the percent price reduction during promotions.
Safeway and Albertsons both utilize a high-low pricing strategy that involves heterogeneous markups across the supermarket, accompanied by advertised price cuts for a selected subset of products that is typically adjusted on a weekly basis. Consumers obtain the promotions by swiping their club cards. Club cards at Safeway and Albertsons are free, making it reasonable to assume that most WIC-participants who shop at these locations would have them, and be able to receive the promotional discounts on their WIC purchases. Table 8 compares the frequency and depth of promotions of WIC-eligible and control products. Control products were defined according to the same procedure used for the markup analysis. When considering all available WIC-eligible food categories, results indicate that WICeligible items are on sale more frequently (7% more than control products) and are offered at slightly larger discounts, an additional 1.3% on average, than their control counterparts when on promotion. In six of the 11 categories WIC-eligible products were promoted less frequently than their counterpart control products. Infant formula represents a prominent example. The solesource WIC infant formula was never on promotion in the data, while control products were on promotion 26% of the time. Yet for other food categories such as cheese, eggs, canned foods and infant foods, WIC-eligible products were promoted more frequently than the control products in that category. Promotional depth for WIC products was less in four of the eleven product categories (milk, dry beans, breakfast cereal, and cheese), and greater for six categories.
Potential Program Savings from Improved Cost Containment
We performed two simulation analyses to gauge the magnitude of cost savings achievable in CA through improved cost containment. First we "resold" all of the FIs sold during the 29-month analysis period at vendors with one to five registers at the largest vendor operating in the same county as the excluded small vendor. For example, in Los Angeles County, the small-vendor FI would be resold in Los Angeles County vendors with 10 or more registers, thus holding county effects on prices constant. In Calaveras County, however, the largest authorized vendor has nine registers, so the FI redeemed at small-register vendors in Calaveras County were resold, figuratively, at the county's nine-register vendor. We chose one to five register vendors for the simulation because the econometric analysis demonstrated that nearly all of the available cost savings associated with sales at larger vendors was achieved with vendors operating six or more registers. This simulation provides a sense of the maximum program cost savings that could be achieved if cost competitiveness were enhanced among the smaller authorized vendors to a level equivalent or nearly equivalent to that of large vendors.
For each FI sold by a one to five register vendor in county j, we predict based upon the econometric model for that FI what the FI would have cost if it had been redeemed at a 10+ register store or, if there are none, the largest-register vendor that is operating in that same county. The difference in cost between the actual redemption value in the FI sold by the smaller store and the predicted redemption value in the larger store is the estimated Program savings. Table 9 reports the results of the simulation. Program cost savings on the FI redeemed by the smaller vendors is quite substantial, but the percent savings also varies considerably across FI.
Savings on purchases of milk-based powder formula would be about 34.0% or about $37.1 million over the 29-month period. Savings on FI 6012 would be about 30.1% or $16.3 million over the 29-month period. The savings are largest, just over 50%, for the infant combination FI 6145. They are also large for the FI for participants with special dietary needs, FI 6232-40.6%
and FI 6315-46.5%, reflecting that smaller vendors attach their highest markups to these specialty foods.
Table 9. Program Cost Savings from Removing Small Vendor FI Redemptions
Total estimated savings across the FI in table 9 is nearly $94 million for the 29-month period. Even though the percent savings per FI is substantial, the share of FI redeemed at 1 -5 register vendors (column 4) is not large-it ranges from 11.7% (FI 6315) to 20.4% (FI 6011).
The overall percent savings obtained by multiplying the share redeemed by the one-to-five register vendors by the percent savings range from 4.8% (FI 6012) to 10.1% (FI 6145). 
Non Cost Competitive Vendors
The second simulation focuses on the subset of Program vendors that are consistently not cost competitive. FNS regulations (7 CFR §246.12) require state agencies to "authorize vendors We used FIs, 6012, 6003, 6011, and milk-based infant formula, to identify noncompetitive vendors according to these steps: upper tails, indicating that many vendors in these groups charge considerably above the group average, including some that charge more than 50% above the average.
The histograms are quite dramatically different for vendors in the 5-6, 7-9, and 10+ register groups. These distributions are considerably more peaked around the group mean, and the right skew in the histograms for 1-2 and 3-4 register vendors is not present. Indeed, for 10+
register vendors the distribution is left skewed, indicating the significant presence of highly cost 17 Reselling at the mean FI prices for the remaining vendors simulates a scenario whereby noncompetitive vendors are removed from the program, and their customers are left to redeem FIs at an alternative vendor. Over a large number of participants these decisions should result in FIs being redeemed at about the mean redemption value for the remaining vendors.
competitive vendors in that group. In the right tail of the distributions, we find very few large vendors who charge more than 20% above their peer group grand mean. The deviance of non cost-competitive vendors in these peer groups is considerably less than the deviance observed for noncompetitive vendors in the 1-2 and 3-4 register peer group.
Figure 2. Histograms of Grand Means by Register Groups
Results from the simulation are contained in register vendors prices tend to be low relative to the overall vendor average.
The bottom portion of the table aggregates across the vendor peer groups to get the cumulative percent savings. The available savings range from 1.0% for formula to 1.7% for FIs 6003 and 6011 from removing the least competitive 5% of vendors from all peer groups, and range from 2.0% for FI 6012 to 3.4% for FI 6011 from eliminating the least competitive 10%.
The least competitive vendors operating in the CA WIC Program are mainly concentrated in the peer groups with 1-2 and 3-4 registers, and on average they don't sell a lot of FIs, so their removal from the program, assuming that their customers on average buy at the mean redemption value for the remaining vendors, doesn't save the state that much money. The peer grouping system in place in California prior to May 2012 was ineffective in restraining the prices charged by small vendors. It was based on the misguided premise that agglomerating similar vendors within a peer group and using their past pricing performance to set price ceilings for each FI would be an effective cost-containment mechanism. Given that vendors of similar type and circumstance have similar economic incentives regarding participation and performance in the program, it is not surprising that a great many small vendors charged high prices for Program foods, which caused the FI price ceilings to be set at high levels based upon equation (1), with further increases in the ceilings engendered by the extreme heterogeneity of vendor pricing behavior within these peer groups.
The positive news from this analysis was the evidence that larger vendors (those operating six or more registers) performed much better in containing costs in the Program, and that the moderately sized vendors were comparably price competitive with the largest vendors.
Furthermore, our analysis for selected CA retail chains found no evidence that these chains marked up WIC products more or promoted them less than comparable control products. For these retailers, the opportunity to increase profits on sale of WIC products by attaching extra markups due to the WIC participants' inelastic demands is apparently dominated by the negative impact that such a strategy would have on store patronage by non WIC customers. Oklahoma, and Texas, require the purchase of least-cost brands, effectively resolving the policy issue in favor of cost containment. California is among states at the opposite end of the spectrum in terms of allowing considerable participant choice. However, the greater the scope of participant choice the less effective any price ceiling will be in facilitating cost containment because the price ceiling must be set high enough so that FI redemption values do not exceed the price ceiling when participants choose a particularly expensive bundle of items in combination FI. Ceilings set to achieve this objective will often fail to bind when some vendors excessively markup WIC products. State Programs need to consider both of these impacts of broad choice on cost containment when making decisions on product authorization.
Despite the perverse incentives for participants and some retailers due to the structure of the WIC Program, our conclusion is that cost containment in the Program is not a wicked problem for several reasons. First, although smaller vendors have incentives to excessively markup WIC products and, in fact, did so in California, the impact on overall Program performance is limited if most participants redeem FI at larger vendors, who our analysis shows do not, on average, attach extra markups to WIC products, or at A-50 vendors, whose pricing is already well restrained by FNS regulations. Second, small-vendor cost containment can be improved by not allowing them to in effect "self police," which has been the case in California, and, instead, using larger vendors redemptions to set FI price ceilings for smaller vendors.
Finally, federal regulators and state agencies must make wise decisions regarding the scope of participant choice to allow in designing programs, recognizing that expanding choice to include the most expensive brands, products, and package sizes increases programs' costs in multiple dimensions.
